| #208 |  | 1066 |  |
June 18, 2009 |  | By Rohit Singh | ||
|
By carrying out strikes during the recent general elections in India (April-May 2009), the Naxals (ultra-left non-state actors) have achieved intense publicity. The Naxals had strategised well. They anticipated the media plans of ‘live telecast’ and coincided their attacks with the election coverage. Naxal attacks on security forces have become an everyday affair, at times upto 20 security personnel losing their lives in a spate of attacks over just three days, as was the case in Jharkhand in June 2009. The Mumbai carnage was unprecedented in that it was a first case of mass fire assault – a calculated mayhem, the like of which has no parallels in terms of longevity and brutality of the attacks. Similarly, the audacity of the Naxal attacks in the face of massive para-military deployment, has brought the growing menace of the Naxal ultras to the centre-stage.. Unknown to many, the Naxals have scored many firsts of their own in the year 2008, which by itself should have begged the attention of the internal security apparatus of the country.Taking a cue from the suicide attacks across Pakistan, the Naxal ‘think-tank’ is debating the merits and demerits of suicide attacks. Police sources in Chattisgarh have reported of one school of thought which feels that forming suicide squads would be against their ideological moorings, since Naxals were not a ‘fundamentalist’ organisation. However, another view drew attention to the devastating success of such attacks and its debilitating effect on the minds of the state, the security forces, and the media. A passenger train collided with a goods wagon at a Chennai suburb on April 29, 2009 killing four commuters and injuring 11 others. Now, the police say they are investigating the possibility of the train being driven by a person from Andhra Pradesh, whose body remained unclaimed. The person is believed to have jumped off the moving train before it rammed the stationary goods train. It could well be a case of the Naxals putting their ‘suicide attack’ modus operandi on trial. Reports that the CPI (Maoist) leadership has decided to support the Azad Kashmir struggle is also worrisome. In a document released by the CPI (Maoist) on August 1, 2008, the outfit urged its fighters from the People Liberation Gureilla Army (PLGA) to join the Kashmir Movement. The Naxals feel that the agitation in J&K following the Amarnath land transfer row in June/July 2008, was an anti-national stance, and time was ripe for the Naxals to fuel the fire in Kashmir. 2008 was a landmark year for the Naxals on another score. The number of casualties inflicted by the Naxals was the highest in over three decades. A total number of 262 security force personnel and 457 civilians were killed. The year included some lethal and audacious attacks such as the ransacking of the armoury in Nayagarh, Orissa in which more than 1000 arms were looted, the highest ever in Naxal violence in a single incident and the ambush in Balimela Reservoir in Orissa which killed 36 members of the Andhra Pradesh Police ‘Greyhounds’ force. They followed this up with an ambush on 17 SOG Personnel of Orissa Police in Malkangiri district on July 16, 2008. These attacks marked a significant upgrade in the Maoist firepower and tactics. The Maoists (like the Taliban in the Af-Pak border), have been urging the villagers in Koraput and Malkangiri districts of Orissa to form ‘Village Committees’, and ‘Praja Courts’, to create a semblance of local self-government, to settle disputes without approaching the police or government agencies. In a notable ‘first’ among Maoist struggle, the Nepal Maoists and mainstream parties formed a government. There is a lesson in it for the Indian Maoists to initiate a dialogue process with the Government of India, as they have observed the Nepal Maoists reaping the benefits of protracted negotiation. There will be opposition to this proposition, as it amounts to a paradigm shift, in the way the Naxals believe they can achieve their goals, that is through violent insurrection. On the economic and social fronts the central and the state governments have to ensure equitable distribution of wealth and local resources for the tribals and local inhabitants. The exploitation of resources at the hands of private and multi-national companies who are setting up projects in the area has to be checked and regulated. Local governmental agencies have to be more visible and active in the far-flung villages. They should be seen to be aiding to the welfare of the people and thereby wean them away from Maoist influence, the latter having become the arbitrer of justice and benefits. Grassroot level political leaders should take a lead role in this regard and cater to the local issues and needs of the people. The Conngress leader Rahul Gandhi’s regular hinterland tour of the past five years is an excellent example. Despite some successes, the reach and potency of the Naxals is growing and many analysts believe that ultimately the army may have to be involved in fighting them. But this may have its own internal ramifications for the army which is already heavily deployed in counter-insurgency operations and border management. The police and para-military forces, however, have to adopt a more pro-active posture in combating the Naxals, rather than being garrisoned at some villages and centres, leaving the vast swath of territory open to the Naxals. In this, the army’s expertise in tactics, field craft, manoeuvre in ambush and fire-assault, night-fighting capabilities, detection of land-mines, intelligence gathering, building up of morale of troops in adverse conditions and winning the hearts and minds of the local populace can be imparted at the new jungle warfare training schools. Para-military companies can be routinely placed under army battalions for orientation programmes before being inducted into the anti-naxal operations. By striking during the elections and increasing the scale and lethality of their attacks, coupled with their attempts to form linkages with terrorist and insurgent groups points to a widening arc and intensity of conflict. It is imperative for the new government to counter this rising tide with a comprehensive politico-military strategy, before it is too late. There should be increased centre-state co-ordination and synergy in action to deal with this problem. (Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
| ||||||||
| ||||||||
|
Rohit Singh |
