William Burns� Visit to India: An Assessment

The US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, William Burns, made a three-day visit to India from 10 to 13 June 2009. It was a first by a senior official of the Barack Obama administration during the UPA government’s second innings. The main agenda of the visit was to prepare ground for the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s visit to India in July 2009 and chart out course for the next phase of the Indo-US strategic partnership. Burns met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Home Minister P Chidambaram, Foreign Minister S M Krishna, Leader of the Opposition L K Advani, National Security Advisor M K Narayanan and Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and discussed wide-ranging issues of bilateral cooperation and concern. At the outset, Burns conveyed that India was a major foreign policy priority for the US and would be a crucial global partner of Washington in the 21st century. He further informed that the Obama administration believed that India and the US can do a great deal together and was committed to broaden and deepen relationship with India.

William Burns also conveyed a message from Washington for resumption of the stalled Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan. But, India was categorical that any dialogue process with its western neighbour could not be resumed as long as terror attacks emanate from there. India also conveyed to Burns its disappointment on Islamabad’s inaction on the identified terrorists responsible for Mumbai attacks. It cited the release of Hafeez Saeed, the chief of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), by the Lahore High Court mainly due to Pakistan government’s inability to file adequate charges against him. India is also unimpressed with the seriousness of Pakistan’s ‘war on terror’. According to India, Pakistan is serious in denting Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but not the Afghan Taliban, which is seen as a ‘strategic ally’. New Delhi sees no logic in such a distinctive approach. Much to India’s disappointment, Pakistan has also been ignoring the wide network between Taliban and various other terror groups in the country. India wants Pakistan to take concrete action in breaking this network. If Pakistan acts seriously, India is ready “go more than half a distance” to resume talks with its neighbour.

Given the present Obama administration's firm focus on the Af-Pak policy, Burns has been exploring various modalities of cooperation between the two countries on Afghanistan. Although, nothing came out concretely on the exact aspects of cooperation, both countries decided to have close consultations on means for stabilising Afghanistan. It was also agreed to take the level of cooperation on this issue forward when Hillary visits India in July.

The fact that the present US administration is serious on nuclear non-proliferation is evident by the appointment of non-proliferation hawk Robert Einhorn as the US State Department's special advisor for non-proliferation and arms control and Timothy Roemer as the new US envoy to India. Although the US termed the bilateral civil nuclear agreement with India as a major accomplishment, it wants India along with Pakistan and Israel to sign CTBT and NPT. But India refused citing “discrimination”. India over and again reiterated its credentials as “a responsible nuclear power” and its commitment to universal nuclear disarmament. India wants real action towards disarmament and time-bound, legally binding steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. This position is not expected to change despite pressures from the US. Burns tested the pulse in New Delhi on the issue to incorporate it as an agenda in an appropriate manner during the upcoming visit by Hillary Clinton.

One could see some movement forward on defence cooperation. Finalisation of ‘End user Verification Agreement’ (EUVA) for all defence purchases by India from the US was discussed at length. India feels it is sensitive to allow physical onsite verification of defence equipments purchased from the US. Presently, such an arrangement does not exist with any other country. As an alternative, India is ready to show inventory records in addition to giving an undertaking.

However, considering the US’ legal requirement and also of requirement of such an arrangement to guide all future purchases instead of the present case-by-case approach, India may relent for a mutually agreed version of EUVA. The US has also given assurance to New Delhi to activate the verification clause only on a credible complaint. India looks towards signing of the EUVA during  Hillary Clinton’s visit after an agreeable draft is finalised in the interim. There are two other agreements in the pipeline: ‘Logistics Support Agreement’ (LSA) on cashless transfers of fuel and supplies between the two militaries and ‘Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement’ (CISMOA) that will enable the two armies to communicate on a common platform. But the main priority now is EUVA. Through this India will be in a position to buy several critical items like fighter airplanes, transport planes and armoured helicopters.

A tangible outcome of Burns visit came in the form of a decision to set-up a joint working group (JWG) to monitor plans to expand education ties. The proposed Group will closely look at US investment in the education sector (secondary, higher and vocational) and a relook at present investment guidelines in the sector. The US thinks that present Indian guidelines are stringent for any meaningful investment. Present JWG is considered powerful by virtue of chairmanship at the ministerial level. The Group will meet once every year alternately in India and USA. India is expected to benefit more from this cooperation.

On the whole, Burns’ visit was positive in taking the relations a step forward and in preparing a blueprint for the upcoming visit of the Secretary of State. However, the future course of relations depends on how Washington takes into consideration and acts on India’s sentiments on issues like non-proliferation and Pakistan as a breeding ground for terrorism.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).