Covert Intelligence Operations: Counter-Terror Viability?

The, “surrender”, “arrest’ or “hand over” of the Chairman of the banned ULFA terrorist group Arabinda Rajkhowa has once again highlighted the significance of covert intelligence (Cove Int) operations  as a viable counter terrorism strategy. The ambiguity that surrounded apprehension of the ULFA chief who has been absconding for decades with an ever resourceful and imaginative Indian media spinning the story in multiple circles is a part of any Cove Int operation based on deniability. While the actual circumstances that led to government forces getting hold of Rajkhowa may never be known, smooth conduct of the entire operation indicates that Cove Int operations may provide a viable counter terror- option for, “soft” states as India.

Cove Int operations include actions such as sabotage, subversion, assassination and apprehension and are not new, forming the overall repertoire of intelligence organisations. The essence of a covert intelligence operation is its deniability and in its higher form also includes proxy war. These are different from clandestine operations. While the identity of the perpetrator is generally known but cannot be established in a covert operation, clandestine operations cannot be attributed to any actor, thereby remaining totally furtive.

In the information age, with the camera and the reporter chasing every piece of news, keeping such operations away from the media glare is always difficult as was evident from the Rajkhowa case. More over the propensity of security officials for revelations also makes concealing information very difficult. Thus information management would have to be a key facet of Cove Int operations strategy in the future.

The potential of Cove Int operations has been recognised over the years and these have been used successfully by a number of intelligence agencies across the world. The CIA and Mossad, apart form the KGB of yesteryears, were known to be masters of this “skill”. The CIA has the authorisation of the US President for conduct of such operations providing it legal sanctity. The extensive use of drones in Iraq and Af-Pak has added a technology dimension to such operations.

While there may be some legal and moral issues in conduct of covert intelligence operations, in targeting terrorist groups and their leaders as well as other non state actors as criminal groups, these could be justified with minimal collateral damage. In the Rajkhowa case the outcome has had no adverse fallout as the operation was conducted very smoothly. On the other hand sabotage may result in casualties to innocents and will become the object of public as well as legal scrutiny. However Cove Int operation will remain viable options against non-state actors and need to be utilised to effect in the days ahead, given the multi-spectral challenges faced by India in this dimension. 

To be successful, Cove Int operations would have to form part of the overall counter terrorism strategy and the intelligence agencies be legally authorised to carry out the same. There was considerable debate in India over such operations after 26/11 last year, with many analysts claiming that the authority to conduct had been withdrawn from the external intelligence agency RAW, while others suggesting continuance of such operations, the latter possibly falling in the genre of clandestine operations.

In India the authority to sanction such operations rests with the executive head of state, being the Prime Minister. Given Dr Manmohan Singh’s assertion post Sharm-El-Sheikh that India need not fear any investigation of a role in Balochistan, there could be reasons to believe that there was no official sanction for RAW for Cove Int operations outside the country. Has there been a change in the policy with the current operation leading to apprehension of Rajkhowa and other ULFA fugitives will never be known. However state authorities are fully empowered to authorise such actions and should not hesitate to do so in public interest particularly against counter terrorist groups and criminal organizations for that remains the only option to neutralise their leadership.

Given the transnational spread of terrorist groups today, these operations would have to be carried out across national borders in which case assistance by the host nation could be sought. This may not be forthcoming in most cases given the ambiguous nature of such activities and the hostile intent of neighbours as Pakistan.

Coming back to the Rajkhowa case it is obvious that the Bangladesh government has facilitated this operation if not actively supported it, given that the ULFA leadership has been “staying” there over the years. This was a strong goodwill act on the part of the Awami League government preceding the visit of the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India in January 2010 and will set the tempo for betterment of Indo- Bangladesh relations.

However the Indian government had to possibly exercise some amount of pressure on Bangladesh to deliver. The joint meeting of the Home Secretaries preceded the arrest of Rajkhowa and the Home Minister P Chidambaram has been very actively pursuing neighbours over a period travelling to the countries to seek their cooperation.

Similar pressure would have to be built on Myanmar and even China with reports of Paresh Barua, Commander in Chief of the ULFA being sheltered there. To what extent this would be forthcoming remains to be seen.

The US Predator operations against the Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives in Pakistan also have the tacit approval of the Pakistani leadership. Most recently this has been extended to North Waziristan after a series of visits by US military commanders including the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullens and Central Command Chief to Islamabad.

In the case of India, cooperation from Pakistan cannot be expected. Thus there could be a need to graduate from covert operation to clandestine ones, thereby completely preventing the signature from being over ground. In any case the threat of such operations should be able to deter terrorist groups, the leaders and their supporters from launching attacks on India .

In the era of proliferation of malign non-state actors, targeting leaders of terrorist groups and criminal organisations may perhaps provide maximum dividends from a covert operation. These will be fruitful only once an organisation has been sufficiently weakened to prevent any scope of viable succession. The ULFA is seen to be at this stage and therefore Rajkhowa’s custody by the government should culminate into completion of the process of politicization of the outfit, for that should be the overall goal of such high value operations.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).