Pakistan Army: Fighting the Right War, the Wrong Way

The Pakistan Army claims to have controlled the Tehreek e Taliban (TTP) in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) by a mix of kinetic operations and deals with guerrilla leaders such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan. Despite these short term gains, the strategy employed is faulty and will only prolong the militancy, bring grief to the people of the region, bolster the Taliban and fail to contribute to stability in the Af-Pak region.

The indicators are ominous. The flow of refugees is increasing as Pakistani security forces unmindful of the result of their actions is continuing with air and helicopter strikes and thus creating long term fissures in society. As per UN estimates there are 290,000 displaced tribal from South Waziristan alone who are refusing to return.

On 10 April, 63 civilians were killed in Sra Viala area of Tirah in air strikes by the Pakistani forces. The incident was widely condemned and forced the Army Chief to apologise, a first for the Pakistan Army, who announced a compensation of Rs 200,000 each to the families of those killed and Rs100,000 each to the injured.

Despite these palliatives it was feared that this would only add to the rank of sympathisers of the Taliban or groups such as the Lashkar e Islam which were being targeted in this instance. As a Daily Times report by Daud Khattak on 19 April stated, “A single and easy answer to all the complicated questions is that the net result would be hatred against Pakistani security forces, the government and the country among the affected people, their friends, neighbours, colleagues and people living in their neighbourhood”.

The political leadership seems to be completely divested of responsibility for military action and is not able to question the nature of these operations and how these are resulting in continued terror attacks leading to large number of civilian deaths.

The Army is seen chasing militants across various agencies while the terrorist groups seem to be giving the security forces a slip. Even as the hide and seek game continues it is only civilians who are facing the brunt, caught in the crossfire between terrorist groups and the security forces. For instance Khyber agency where operations have now been launched and particularly the Bara Tehsil was cleared of militants. Now it is said that some continue to operate in Akakhel area and therefore a new phase of operations is required. The militants in Swat are reported to have shifted base in Kala Dhaka from where they are able to operate in the Hazara dominated areas and strike at will.

Another strand of the counter-militancy strategy, holding temporary truce with some groups to facilitate targeting others, also seems to be floundering. While a peace deal was made in North Waziristan with Tehreek e Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur the incessant drone strikes has made North Waziristan militants restive and they have struck twice in April on Army convoys killing ten soldiers including an officer.

Fully committed in South Waziristan, Orakzai and Swat, the Army does not have the capability to take on militant groups in North Waziristan, where a number of Taliban including Al Qaeda have concentrated. Moreover if groups in the South and North Waziristan come together it would be a major blow to counter militancy operations in the area.

On the development front, the Army claims to have made substantial gains. Lieutenant General Asif Yasin Malik, the Corps Commander claimed that relief and development works of the Army would bring about “qualitative change in socio-economic conditions” in FATA. “All development works will be completed in stipulated time and march towards a better future will continue unhindered,” he is reported to have said. The Army has a budget of Rs 4,500 million rupees and is constructing two major roads, Tank-Jandola-Makeen and Tank-Wana in Phase-I while two roads Shaki to Makeen and Wana to Torwam will be constructed in Phase-II of development project.

There are conflicting reports on this front too, while the Army is claiming that the people are satisfied with the development work and supporting operations human rights groups are stating that there is large scale distress and paucity of funds is preventing proper aid delivery. The continuing pain is likely to have a snowballing impact in creating another constituency of discontented locals who will be trapped by Taliban’s warped appeal of extremism.

Pitching tribal lashkars against the Taliban is another arm of the counter-militancy strategy. On this front too there is resistance. A report indicates that Mehsud elders of South Waziristan have refused to return to the area and form lashkars to combat the Taliban despite some aggressive lobbying by the political agent Shahab Ali Shah.
 
On the whole, the failure to understand the challenge from the Taliban is a critical component of the shortcomings in Pakistan’s counter-militancy strategy. The Taliban have created another layer of social hierarchy comprising of religious fundamentalists in the existing structure in FATA who are not amenable to traditional tribal authority. The Taliban strength also lies in the pan tribal appeal of their movement across FATA and agencies of NWFP or now Khyber Pakhtoonwa. While the army succeeded in splitting the Taliban in North and South Waziristan and isolated the Mehsuds, there are indications now that this may have been just a short term tactical gambit of the guerrillas. More over with their inability to address tribal areas simultaneously the Army has left large gaps where the Taliban are operating with impunity.

Of late General Kayani and other Pakistani commanders have been stating that internal security is the main challenge, but by adopting a flawed strategy, they may be fighting the right war the wrong way.

Brig Rahul Bhonsle, SM (Retd) is a leading defence analyst based in New Delhi.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).