Pakistan�s Security Profile 2013: The Kayani Impact

Pakistan’s security profile in 2013 will in many ways determine regional threat dynamics. This is when Pakistan’s Army Chief General Pervez Ashraf Kayani is due to complete his current extension of tenure and thus almost six years as the main defence and foreign policy architect in Islamabad. In the normal course, elections in Pakistan should be held the same year, with NATO expected to depart from Afghanistan in 2014. Thus a view of what the Army Chief may or may not be able to achieve at the end of his tenure may be relevant.

During Kayani’s first three years as Army Chief, he carried the baggage of being the ISI Chief and behaved as head of intelligence, paranoia writ all over his demeanour. Lacking the finesse and statesmanship which should be the mark of the head of a national army, his style was that of a brow-beating bully and a cloak and dagger sleuth combined. An example of his style is the manner in which NATO convoys were blocked for alleged transgression of Pakistan airspace even as scores of drone attacks in the tribal belt which caused loss of civilian lives went uncontested.

While he has been able to restore professional credibility  of the Pakistan Army bruised by many ‘surrenders’ and desertion in ranks as well as lethal attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban from 2007 onwards, the jury of overall effectiveness of counter-militancy operations in the tribal areas is still out. The typical “witches brew” of peace deals with some tribal groups such as the Wazirs in South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in the North, while the pounding of the Mehsuds continued on the other may have put the renegades on the backfoot, but allegations of brutality and collateral death of civilians abound and may come up in the days ahead.

Leaving the past, some of the policies that Kayani is encouraging and which have a bearing on the emerging situation in 2013 may be of greater interest. A three-year extension of tenure which also coincides with that of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led civilian government in Islamabad assures Kayani of a passive political government in power. He has also taken the insurance of meeting Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab and the second most important leader of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, three times in the past. This has kept the PPP on tenterhooks and kept channels open with former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whose political star is in the ascendancy of late.

At present Kayani seemingly lacks political ambitions and is willing to let the Zardari-Gillani duo tackle the many challenges of governance in Pakistan, but what happens in 2013 remains to be seen. Presently the political support coerced or otherwise allows him to shape policy in other spheres.

Speaking of Afghanistan, despite American pressure Pakistan has done little to rein in the Haqqani group or Afghan Taliban. The Haqqanis have been provided sanctuary in Khurram Agency and have shifted their base from North Waziristan to ensure that in case operations are launched in that area, they are out of the line of fire. Khurram, with its Shia-Sunni strife is calm as of now and relocation of the Haqqanis will provide them access to Eastern Afghanistan’s key provinces including the capital Kabul.

The recent fiasco of a fake Taliban leader talking with the Afghan President could not have happened without the knowledge of the ISI demonstrating the intent of the Agency to the reconciliation process. The Haqqanis and Afghan Taliban are thus likely to be potent enough in 2013 to destabilise Kabul in a post-NATO scenario.

General Kayani’s other strategic shift granting free access to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Northern Areas, now renamed Gilgit Baltistan (GB), is of concern for India. While Selig Harrisons’ report has been dismissed by many, Pakistan has admitted presence of the Chinese for rescue and relief as well as security of construction works. Lately it has been saying that GB will not be a part of any negotiations on Jammu & Kashmir. By virtually giving away this area to the Chinese, a new twist is thus being attempted to the long-standing dispute. Chinese declaration of Northern Areas as Northern Pakistan and stapled visas to Indian citizens from the state only adds to the deliberate fuzziness on the issue.

On the capacity building front, General Kayani’s efforts are no less alarming. The defence budget for 2010-11 has been increased to $6.41bn from Revised Estimates for 2009-10 of $4.39 bn. This is a jump of 45 per cent within one year to which the parliament is not privy and the International Monetary Fund looking the other way. Concurrently Americans are coughing up an additional $2 Billon in military aid while supply of F16 Block B/D fighters is now on stream. The Sino-Pakistan JF 17 joint production and inflow of F 22 P Frigates denotes substantial capacity building in place. Accretions to the nuclear and missile arsenal are QED in this overall paradigm.

This carefully crafted strategy calibrating on the fears of the West as well as China is providing Kayani and his team sufficient leverage to continue to fan the embers of the dying militancy in Kashmir while keeping India’s expectations on action against perpetrators of 26/11 alive by sporadic titbits such as the proposal for a judicial commission.

So what we see in 2013 is Pakistan’s expanded conventional and nuclear capability and the use of terror as a diplomatic tool both in India and Afghanistan, NATO’s weak footprint in Kabul and the PLA in close proximity of Skardu and Gilgit. This is certainly not a doomsday scenario for India, but one that should shake off the lethargy of the security and diplomatic establishment.

Brig Rahul Bhonsle, SM (Retd) is an independent defence analyst based in New Delhi

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies)