Network Centricity: Meeting the Chinese Challenge in 2020

The release of the White Paper on China’s National Defence, a bi-annual event, is eagerly awaited by China watchers in India. To those regularly following Chinese military developments, the content of China’s Defence White Paper 2010 released on 31 March may not provide any new light on Beijing’s strategic approach or military developments. The Chinese security world view is generally in line with current global strategic thought at least in articulation though interpretation may lead to different conclusions.

China sees a mix of traditional and non-traditional threats much as other countries across the globe with ‘strategic uncertainty’ being the defining paradigm in the decade ahead. The Chinese special concerns are the three Ts, Taiwan, Turkestan (East) and Tibet, surprisingly stated in that order in the White Paper. Thus the role of the Chinese military is extended from meeting conventional military challenges to, “maintaining social harmony and stability”. Commitment to ‘No First Use’ of nuclear weapons and non-targeting of non nuclear weapon states has been reiterated. At the same time, China will not initiate disarmament, the onus has been clearly placed on those who possess the largest nuclear arsenal i.e. the US and Russia.

When compared with previous White Papers, some seminal developments in Chinese military thought are evident. The PLA is now moving from reform and development which was the underlying theme earlier to rapid modernisation. Evidently the Revolution in Military Affairs portrayed in 2004 which involved restructuring of the armed forces has been completed. The goal of restructuring and reduction of forces to a base figure of 2.3 million highlighted in the White Paper of 2006 has clearly been met and the PLA is likely to field this strength in the near future.

Does this imply that the reforms have been completed? The overall impression is that it is still a work in progress. Suffice to say in an official document in the public domain two trends of window dressing and limited information on key programmes are the norm as seen in the White Paper 2010.

There is however demonstration of greater maturity in thinking of the PLA with focus on jointness and informationisation. The impetus so far particularly in the latter may see a surge in the decade ahead, thereby creating a network- centric force though the Chinese have not used the term in the operational context in the Paper. But the Chinese goal is to complete informationisation by 2020 under an overall plan of, “accelerating the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces”.

The focus on jointness may also be gleaned from the structure of the 2008 and 2010 White Papers. While the former talks about the PLA Army, Navy and Air Force in separate chapters the 2010 paper has combined these facets in two chapters, modernisation of the PLA and deployment of the armed forces. The PLA Army, Navy and Air Force have been given separate treatment in these sections.

Another important development in the White Paper of 2010 is the space devoted to outline Chinese efforts for, ‘Maintaining World Peace and Stability’. A thrust on projection of military capabilities abroad, be it in the garb of countering nontraditional threats by the PLA Navy in distant waters or strategic projection by the PLAAF denotes the outward looking approach of the Chinese military and is corroborated by recent Chinese forays abroad, particularly by the PLA Navy. In the tactical field, the aviation component of the PLA Army has emerged as, “a main battle assault force”, though how much it would be effective in the high altitude areas of the Tibetan plateau remains to be seen.

The informationisation trajectory of the PLA has moved from conceptual and doctrinal underpinnings outlined in previous Papers to fielding new systems and their testing through training and deployment under diverse conditions. The thrust is now on, “[PLA] informationisation on raising its fighting capabilities based on information systems, and enhances the capabilities in firepower, mobility, protection, support and informationisation”.

The Chinese are also increasingly using network generated efficiencies to enhance speed of deployment of Second Artillery, fielding smart ammunition, expanding long- range mobility demonstrated during the multi-front exercise Xiahue and streamlining logistics support. Integration of reconnaissance, surveillance and fire control is also an ongoing process and the Paper claims progress in this field.

Developments in the field of information infrastructure have been described as a, “step change”. A nationwide optical fibre network will be the mainstay superimposed by satellite and short-wave communications systems providing the Chinese military a high degree of survivability in a modern electronically sensitive command environment.

While jointness is perhaps in the first stage of conceptualisation, this is one of the key facets of the future trajectory of modernisation and thus rapid strides could be expected in the years ahead. Similarly joint military training and logistics are also receiving increased attention and optimising efficiency through joint systems may be the way ahead. Leadership training and development has also received special attention as a “Strategic Project for Talented Individuals”. Significantly future leaders will be trained for joint operations and innovation.

The Chinese progress in science and development in the civil field will be exploited by integrating the civilian and military technology programmes. This may enable rapid development of systems even though the White Paper accepts that the PLA is based on second generation systems while third generation forms the, “backbone”.
 
On the whole the Defence White Paper 2010 provides a perspective of the trajectory of Chinese military developments in the decade ahead. For India China will remain a major competitor regionally as well globally. However the stage of modernisation and development of the PLA should not evoke panic responses.

The Chinese grand strategy has not changed with limited expansionist intent at least in the immediate future. This may reflect the current state of the PLA and may change once the same improves. By developing a network centric capability co-joining the armed forces under a joint rubric, the Indian armed forces should be able to meet the Chinese challenge in the years ahead. The solution may seem simple but as Clausewitz remarks in the field of military the simplest things are always the most difficult.

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) is a Defence Analyst based in New Delhi

(The views expressed in the article are that of the author and do not represent the views of the editorial committee or the centre for land warfare studies).