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February 20, 2012 |  | By Brig Gurmeet Kanwal | ||
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The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)finally gave its approval to the establishment of the NationalCounter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in mid-January, two years after it was firstconceived following the Mumbai terror strike on November 26, 2008. A monthlater, seven chief ministers have expressed strong opposition to the NCTC onthe grounds that the states were not consulted and that the functioning of theproposed NCTC will undermine the federal structure of India’s Constitution. This opposition comes despitethe fact that the structure of the NCTC approved by the CCS is a watered downversion of the form in which the NCTC had been originally conceived by the HomeMinister, Mr P. Chidambaram, following the Mumbai terror attacks. In an addressto officers of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) on December 23, 2009, the HomeMinister had envisioned the NCTC as an organisation capable of “preventing aterrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack should one take place, andresponding to a terrorist attack by inflicting pain upon the perpetrators.” The NCTC had been envisagedas an umbrella organisation, which would exercise control over agencies likethe National Investigation Agency (NIA), the National Technical ResearchOrganisation (NTRO), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the National CrimeRecords Bureau (NCRB) and the National Security Guard (NSG). It will now beplaced under the Intelligence Bureau and the existing Multi-Agency Centre (MAC)will be subsumed in it. The NCTC will draw up andcoordinate counter-terrorism plans, integrate intelligence gathering andcoordinate with all the existing investigating and intelligence agencies. TheNATGRID (National Intelligence Grid), which was approved by the CCS in June2011, will provide a data bank of 20 databases like travel records, immigrationdetails and income tax records as inputs to the NCTC. Unless the NCTC is empoweredto conduct counter-terrorism operations like its US counterpart, on which theIndian agency was expected to be based, urban terrorism will continue to remaina cause for concern, and much will remain to be done in the planning andexecution of India’s counter-terrorism policies, the execution of which ismired in systemic weaknesses. Though recent terroriststrikes have been sporadic and have been spaced out in time, the overallimpression that prevails is that of an unstable internal security environmentin which the initiative lies with terrorist organisations and they are able tostrike at will. The government needs to review its largely reactive policiesand adopt pro-active measures to fight terrorism, particularly the variety thatemanates from the soil of inimical neighbouring countries. India’s response to theMumbai terror attacks in November 2008 was slow and laborious and poorlycoordinated among the Central and the state governments and their variousagencies. Coastal security was virtually non-existent; the Marine Police weretoo few in number to effectively patrol the vast area entrusted to them; theywere ill-equipped and inadequately trained; and there was poor coordinationbetween the Coast Guard and the Marine Police. It took far too long to beginflushing out operations and then to eliminate the nine terrorists who wereholed up at three separate locations. The government must formulatea comprehensive approach, with all organs of the state coming together toimplement a national-level counter-terrorism strategy to fight terrorism. Thegovernment must draw up a national-level strategy that is inter-ministerial,inter-agency and inter-departmental in character. Such a strategy must also balancethe interests of the Central and the state governments. It must be ensured that thecounter-terrorism policy is based on strong but egalitarian laws. India’sexperiments with POTA, TADA and UAPA have failed to deliver the desiredresults. Laws must be just and humane and must not be designed to either bevindictive towards or shield any particular community or religiousdenomination. The experience of many other countries has proved that it ispossible to formulate strong yet egalitarian counter-terrorism laws. The USestablished a powerful Department of Homeland Security following the 9/11strikes and there has not been a major terrorist attack since then. One major source of the lackof a coordinated approach is the gross disconnect between how the Central andthe state governments view counter-terrorism; there are glaring disparities inthe views held in Delhi and the state capitals. The Constitution must beamended to move “law and order” from the State List to the Concurrent List sothat the Central government can act on its own initiative when necessary,particularly in the case of externally-sponsored terrorism. And it is time thegovernment bifurcated the internal security function of the Ministry of HomeAffairs by having a separate ministry headed by a Cabinet minister. Besides prevention throughaccurate “humint” and “techint” intelligence gathering, successfulcounter-terrorism requires effective intelligence penetration of terroristgroups so that their leadership can be systematically neutralised by anempowered anti-terrorism agency. Comprehensive planning and better stagemanagement are necessary for the quick elimination of a group of terroristsduring a strike while the terrorists are on a killing spree. Post-incident investigationis aimed at unravelling the identities of the planners and the plotters, andbringing to justice the perpetrators of the incident of terrorism. The NIA mustbe reconstituted as it lacks teeth in its present form. It should bere-modelled on the FBI of the US to give it both preventive and investigativepowers. While there is no need to blindly ape any country, there is no harm inlearning from the best practices abroad and incorporating them into Indianpolicies. India’s intelligencecoordination and assessment apparatus at the national level andcounter-terrorism policies remain mired in the days of innocence. We are nowliving in the age of “new terrorism” that is far more violent and vitriolicthan before, and policies must keep pace with the emerging developments. Also,the government must enlarge the scope of its counter-terrorism policy tocovertly eliminate the leaders of terrorist organisations abroad who areactively engaged in sponsoring terrorism in India. This is how we can eliminatethe problem root and branch. The writer is Director,Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Courtesy: The Tribune, 20 February 2012 | ||||||||
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