LTTE Supply Lines from India: A Status Check

The recent spate of arrests in Tamil Nadu has brought to light LTTE’s renewed smuggling network of supply of war materials and other goods from India. Does this mean that India has become a hub of Tigers’ supply chain? What are the materials being smuggled from India? Who is responsible? What are the security implications and how can one deal with them?

Earlier, the Tigers used to procure goods from all over the world, and especially from Southeast Asia since their boats could move around unhampered. But, now the Sri Lankan Navy has not only inflicted considerable damage on their fleet, but has also stepped up vigil on the high seas, thus restricting their movement. As supplies from other sources have dwindled, the LTTE has increased its reliance on India. Moreover, with the ongoing intensity of conflict in the island, demand for materials has also increased. India offers the obvious advantage of geographical proximity, besides the ease of ethnic affinity to build networks with the large number of Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu.

There is a long list of materials - lethal and non-lethal - that are smuggled from India by the LTTE. Lethal materials include those used for making bombs, steel or aluminum ingots for improvised explosive devices, detonators, chemicals and batteries. Non-lethal equipment includes rations, fuel, medicines, motors for speed boats, resin, boat parts, chopped coir mats for building boats, clothes, adhesives, walkie-talkies, GPS devices, mobile SIM cards, lifejackets and multi-tester meters, pistol covers, battery re-chargers, torch lights, satellite receiver phones, combat uniforms, compact discs and life jackets.

The smuggling network operates in modules broadly divided into two sections: procurement and transport. LTTE agents operating in the southern states directly control the procurement modules. The modus operandi is that the LTTE men come in the guise of refugees and develop a smuggling network with the help of LTTE sympathizers and other refugees who have fair knowledge of local conditions. Requisite materials are procured from all over India and smuggled via fishing villages along coasts of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. In Tamil Nadu, the network operates mostly along Rameswaram-Tuticorin-Cuddalore stretch. Both Indians and Sri Lankans are part of the network either because they support the cause of a separate Tamil Eelam, or because it is a quick way of making money. Each successful delivery fetches the couriers about INR 50,000 to 100,000.

Fishermen who are used as couriers are identified carefully. LTTE agents live amongst the fishermen for some time to ascertain confidence before commissioning the task of carrying goods. There is no pattern to the frequency and timing of the movement of supplies. They are carried as and when the security and monitoring agents are found slack. However, the movement of goods takes place mostly at night. Supplies of lethal nature are camouflaged as food materials being taken for personal use. Goods are delivered in mid-sea or near the shore, but not on the shore. The LTTE use their smaller vessels to receive goods from the Indian couriers. Supplies have normally been received along the northwestern coast of Sri Lanka, especially along Mannar. That is why when the Sri Lankan government forces recently captured Viduthalaithivu and the coastal stretch towards its north, LTTE’s supply lines from India were badly affected.
Given the nature of LTTE’s linkages with some militant groups in India, this is a serious security issue.

While extending the ban on the LTTE by two years this May, the Government of India observed that it continues to be an “extremely potent, most lethal and well organised terrorist force in Sri Lanka and has strong connections in Tamil Nadu and certain other pockets of southern India.” New Delhi cited smuggling of essential goods from Tamil Nadu as one of the main concerns. The LTTE’s objective for a separate homeland for Tamils is seen as a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. Breaking the supply base and delivery network of the LTTE is, therefore, a priority for the Indian security establishment. But the issue is how to go about it.

Firstly, political collusion, official complacency, and corruption are partly responsible for the thriving network. These are long-term issues that require urgent attention. Secondly, intelligence and police in the southern states of India, especially Tamil Nadu, should have a coordinated monitoring of activities of all those connected with the LTTE. The recent arrests were facilitated by specific intelligence and intelligence networks of southern states should be strengthened. Finding sleeper cells of the LTTE in India is important at this juncture. Thirdly, increased naval monitoring would, to a great extent, prevent smuggling from the Indian coasts that are still porous. Patrolling, however, has to be more organized, systematic and coordinated with the Sri Lankan Navy, without causing inconvenience to innocent fishermen. These steps would help to significantly address the challenge posed by the LTTE smuggling networks to Indian security.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)