Bodo Uprising

 

Bodos are the oldest inhabitants of Bhramaputra valley who belong to the Indo-Mongoloid stock and speak Tibeto-Burman Bodo language. The Bodos are the largest ethnic and linguistic group of Assam and can be divided into 18 sub-ethnic groups, first classified in the 19th century. Some of these sub-tribes are: - Bodo-Kacharis, Rabha, Sonowal, Lalung, Deori, Dismasa, Barman, Garo, Hajong, and Hojai Kocharis etc. Majority of them are Hindus with a sizable Christian population, the latter being more educated due to the efforts of Christian missionaries. 

 

Under the British, present-day Assam was part of Bengal. It was made a separate province in 1874. Most of the administrative and other jobs continued to be performed by the people from Bengal since the Assamese were less educated ascompared to other parts of India. The Bodo movement was initially a reaction to the campaign of Assamese cultural nationalism. Presently, the rebel group is represented by the Bodo Security Forces (BdSF), now known as NDFB, All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and All Assam Students Union (AASU). Amongst other things, the rebel groups have demanded autonomy that later changed into the demand for an independent state; putting an end to political domination of non-tribals over tribals; deportation of  illegal migrants who have become voters; maintaining security of the borders; and issuing identity cards to Indian citizens, along with constitutional safeguards to Assam. 

 

The groups were able to gain considerable success in getting access to most departments in the administration, including the police, which gave them the power to subvert the system. They also negotiated with the older and more experienced militant groups in the region like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muviah [NSCN (IM)]) in Nagaland, Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Burma and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, besides being in contact with the Bangladesh intelligence agency and Inter-State Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. 

 

Over a period of time, the rebel groups have not been able to retain public support as they started demanding secession much against the local mood. Other reasons for their failure to maintain strong public support are: - rampant corruption and lack of  discipline and commitment; their links with ISI that were looked upon with suspicion by the people of Assam, particularly after 9/11; adoption of violent means, extortion and kidnapping; surrender of ULFA (SULFA) became more popular; conflicting demands by the movement ; and changing methods of operation of Bodo organisations that often led to inter-group violence. 

 

On the other hand, the army earned a good report from the local population. Coordination between the civil, military, para-military and police forces made it difficult for the rebel groups to continue their activities. Series of army operations, for e.g. Operation Bajrang, Operation Rhino, and Operation Vijay were carried out against the agitating groups who turned from insurgent to terrorist groups. In addition, the government made efforts to resolve the issue through peaceful dialogue and negotiation. In this regard, the ‘historic tripartite agreement’ was signed between the central government, the government of Assam, and the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF). The Bodo movement became violent after the signing of the Assam Accord (1985) as it did not take care of the ethnic communities and due to the delay in its implementation. The issue was resolved after the signing of the Memorandum of Settlement, also known as Bodo Accord, on February 20, 1993 between the Government of Assam, the ABSU and the Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC). The Bodo Accord provided for setting up of a Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC) within a few districts for social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural advancement within the framework of the Indian Constitution. However, there was a dispute regarding the demarcation of areas that were to be brought under BAC, the extent and degree of powers to be vested in the BAC, and failure to take various groups into confidence before negotiating the settlement. This led to its immediate rejection by some groups.    

 

Presently, the violence is the result of large-scale immigration from West Bengal and Bangladesh, particularly since 1977 that has led to social, economic, environmental and demographic change. Census figures of 1991 and 2001 reveal the percentage of growth of Muslim population against the Hindu population in Assam that has led to insecurity amongst the latter. In 1991, the total Muslim population in Assam was 63.7 lakhs, forming 28.4 % of the total population whereas the total Hindu population was 150.4 lakhs, forming 67.1 % of the total population of Assam. Whereas in 2001, the total Muslim population increased to 82.4 lakhs, forming 30.9% of the total population with 29.3% growth rate against the Hindu population of 172.9, constituting 64.9% of the total population with a growth rate of 14.9%. The election results that have brought in considerable immigrant Muslim population in the state legislative assembly reflect the growing overall clout of the immigrants.

 

The Assamese contest the issue of genuine Indian citizenship. It is stated that the political leadership has supported illegal immigration of Bangladeshis. These immigrants were clandestinely provided with ration cards and their names were included in the voters’ list. This led to large scale agitation by the rebel groups leading to the enactment of Illegal Migrant (Determination by Tribunal) Act or IMDT Act that came into force in 1983 and which the Supreme Court of India set aside in a historic judgement of July 2005. As against the Foreigners Act of 1946, which is applicable to the whole of the country and has a far more effective instrument for the detection and subsequent deportation of illegal immigrants, the IMDT Act is referred to as Illegal Migrants (Protection by Tribunal) Act by the rebels as the onus rests on the litigant. Secondly, as against the Foreigners’ Act, where no appeal against the judgement can be made, under IMDT Act one could appeal both to an appellate tribunal and a High Court that has jurisdiction over the area. Thirdly, complaint against a person for being illegal immigrant could only be filed by someone who lives within a 3 km. radius of the residence of the accused and that the complainant’s affidavit had to be supported by that of another person who also lived within a range of 3 Km from the residence of the accused. Fourthly, the Act is applicable only to those arriving in India after 25 March 1971. Finally, the definition of illegal immigrant was mentioned as one without being in possession of a valid passport or any other travel document or any other lawful document. This made conviction difficult because one could always claim the loss of passport, and the responsibility to prove again fell on the litigant. 

 

The north-eastern region remains isolated due to insufficient government policies of development. . The alienation of the region is also a result of acute socio-economic problems relating to identity crisis, unemployment, and illegal immigration, which the state administrations and the political elite have ignored, or have failed to tackle. In fact, there is lack of political will to handle the issue of illegal immigrants as they now form a major vote bank. Other drawback that has kept the region fragile is: - too much centralisation, lack of transparency, corruption, bureaucratic red-tapism, lack of economic opportunities, nepotism etc. The concept of colonialism is still strong in these sub-national groups due to government’s failure to provide economic and educational opportunities and investment to bring the people into the national mainstream. .

 

To tackle the issues in Assam, active dialogue and negotiation between the government and rebel groups is required. In addition, it is important to win peoples trust and support. In this regard, the development of civil society can not be ignored as it will facilitate building a strong foundation for the development of social, political and economic culture of the region.

 

 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)