India played a major role in the establishment of an independent Bangladesh in 1971. However, since then, New Delhi’s relations with Dhaka have neither been close, nor free from irritants and disputes. In 1975, Bangladesh began to move away from language to Islam as the binding force of Bangladeshi nationalism. This emphasis on Islam, Bangladeshi concerns over India’s military build-up, bilateral disputes over shared water resources, smuggling, attacks on Hindu minorities and religious places in Bangladesh, and drug trafficking make for fluctuations in Indo-Bangladesh relations and threaten the security of the region. In recent years, New Delhi has blamed Pakistani and Bangladeshi militant groups for attacks on religious sites, public venues and public transportation in India.
Bangladesh’s long tradition of inclusive political culture and moderate Islam is increasingly under threat from extremism. 9/11 and the United States War on Terror brought many fundamentalist outfits under the American scanner. These extremists found Bangladesh a soft country, given to easy money laundering, and hence, conducive to establish their base. Further, an unstable social, political and economic setup provided ideal conditions for generating a breeding ground for recruits, support, and safe haven for international terrorist groups. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), alleged in its July 2003 report that the (Islamist) radicals in Bangladesh have links with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF).
The Indian insurgent groups continue to misuse Bangladeshi territory for sanctuary, training camps, transport of arms, and transit. In 2005, the Government of India had prepared a list of 172 Indian insurgent group camps located along the border areas of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Sylhet Division and Chittagong. In addition, a list of 307 criminals/insurgents was handed over to Border Security Force (BSF) and Bangladesh Rifles that are supported by Bangladeshi extremist outfits sponsored by Pakistani Inter-State Intelligence (ISI), with money coming from the Gulf. These groups are also said to be cooperating closely with the Directorate General of Foreign Intelligence (DGFI), the military intelligence agency of Bangladesh and ISI. Further, India has received periodic reports regarding ISI misusing the territory of Bangladesh for their anti-India activity. Bangladesh continues to maintain a policy of complete denial without verifying the details given to them. India has asserted that these insurgents are being supported by Bangladeshi civilian and military intelligence agencies. But, Dhaka counter alleges that anti-Bangladesh elements are operating out of India. India has been regularly taking up these security concerns with Bangladesh at different levels, through diplomatic channels and institutional mechanisms existing between the two countries.
It is estimated that at one point, more than 120 militant groups operated in India's northeast. Various army operations against the militants, and negotiations by the government, led to a relative stability in the region. However, it continues to be a tinderbox. Some of the top Indian militants, active particularly in Northeast India, seeking sanctuary in Bangladesh belong to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) in Tripura, United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the Kanlei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) etc. An Indian army assessment highlights the renewed activities of several fundamentalist organisations in Bangladesh and their impact on the region's overall security. Among others, the report names Jamaat-e-Islami and Islamic Chhatra Shibir, organisations which have maintained an anti-India stance.
Besides, there are also reports of use of the north-eastern territory by Islamist groups as a transit to infiltrate into Jammu & Kashmir. ULFA is also said to be a constituent of the Bangladesh Islamic Manch, a united council under HuJI's leadership. Inter-regional linkages of these groups further worsen the internal security situation in India. For instance, beyond its intra-regional linkages, ULFA is also reported to maintain connection with Nepalese Maoists and the LTTE of Sri Lanka. Maoists have links with various Naxalite groups alleged to be working towards a compact revolutionary zone from the forest tracts of Adilabad district in Andhra Pradesh to Nepal, traversing the forests of Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Orissa.
Illegal migration of Bangladeshis, particularly into the North East, has led to massive uprising and has altered the demographic balance of the region. Better economic prospects, a shortage of local labour and the absence of sufficient mechanism have always been the reasons for this influx. The spurt in official action against illegal Bangladeshi migrants and anti-foreign activism led BK Sharma, Guwahati High Court judge, to comment during his recent ruling: “Bangladeshi infiltrators have not only intruded into every nook and corner of Assam, but have already become kingmakers.” Justice Sharma directed the police to detain and deport 49 foreigners, among them a Pakistani citizen, who had appealed against the ruling of Foreign Tribunals. In Assam, state authorities have stepped up their drive to arrest and push back Bangladeshi immigrants and Assamese student groups are busy identifying suspected foreigners and handing them over to the police. Further, unabated illegal immigration of Bangladeshis into Nagaland is emerging as a major problem in the state. Despite their serious demographic, economic, security and political ramifications in the north-east, these developments continue to remain substantially outside the realm of the security discourse in the country. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh government claims that there is not even a single Bangladeshi migrant in India.
The other contentious issue between India and Bangladesh arises from its riparian borders. The Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) signed between India and Bangladesh in 1974, has been implemented, except for three issues: demarcation of 6.1 km. border in three sectors, namely, Lathitilla-Dumabari (3 km in Assam sector), South Berubari (1.5 km in West Bengal sector), and Muhuri river/ Belonia sector (1.6 km in Tripura); exchange of adverse possession; and exchange of enclaves. There are 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in India. Two Joint Boundary Working Group were set up in 2001 to resolve these pending LBA issues. Article 3 of the LBA provides for the people in these enclaves to be given the right to stay on as nationals of the state to which the enclaves are transferred. Therefore, the government has requested for a joint survey/census of the enclaves. According to Bangladesh, however, any joint surveys are extraneous to the LBA provisions and are not a pre-condition to the exchange of the enclaves. The Indian side, however, emphasizes this requirement for border fencing within and up to 150 yards of the international border even as Bangladesh stresses the need to conform to the 1975 border guidelines and to avoid any action that may adversely impact peace and stability in the border areas.
Under the circumstances where India is busy calming its western borders, the eastern border could suffer from greater instability. In 2005, BSF Director General R.S.Mooshahary said “Bangladesh will soon pose a bigger problem than Pakistan… The India-Bangladesh border is more difficult to man than the India-Pakistan border. At the Pakistan border, both the army and the BSF are deployed, whereas the India-Bangladesh border is manned solely by the BSF.”
Bangladesh considers India as a dominating nation. To increase mutual trust, the opportunities provided can be economic but the challenges are political, i.e., terrorism, fundamentalism and political misuse of religion. To ensure India’s internal security, and to deal with challenges arising from its bordering countries, New Delhi must foster closer linkages with the border population, protect them from subversive propaganda, prevent unauthorized settlements and initiate special developmental programs;. It must establish zero tolerance for cross border terrorism from hostile insurgent groups and criminal elements and upgrade policing and effective crisis response teams in major cities. Information sharing, and efforts to increase inter-agency coordination, between civil, military, para-military and police force department is also critical.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)
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